A plugin's pinned commit can be swapped for attacker code in four AI coding agents
AIR Security reports that Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot and Gemini CLI each check out a plugin's pinned commit without confirming the checkout landed there — “That one missing check is the whole bug” — so an attacker controlling a plugin repository can substitute code that background auto-updates then install without user interaction. Anthropic fixed it in Claude Code 2.1.179 and OpenAI in Codex 0.146.0; Microsoft has shipped no fix for GitHub Copilot and Google deprecated Gemini CLI rather than patch it. The research was found in May 2026, disclosed to the four vendors in June, and carries no CVE identifier.
A malicious GitHub issue chained through Gemini CLI to Editor access on a Google Cloud project
Pillar Security reports that an automated triage workflow running Gemini CLI with the --yolo flag used a deprecated coreTools key instead of the current tools.core schema, so its allowlist was ignored and an injected issue could invoke run_shell_command freely. The runner held Workload Identity Federation credentials in plain text, which could be used to mint GCP tokens and, through a project-wide roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator grant, reach Editor-level access; Google tightened tool scoping, added the credentials file to .geminiignore and narrowed the role to a single service account.
Pillar Security reports sandbox escapes in four AI coding agents, triggered by content inside a repository
Pillar Security published seven sandbox escapes across four AI coding agents — three in Cursor, one in OpenAI's Codex CLI, one in Google's Gemini CLI and two in Google's Antigravity — in which the agent stays inside its sandbox and writes a file that a trusted tool outside the sandbox later runs, loads or scans. The routes include a workspace-controlled hook configuration, an agent editing a virtual environment's interpreter, a git-metadata bypass through fsmonitor, a “safe” command allowlist that trusted a git subcommand by name, Docker socket access reaching unsandboxed execution, a macOS Seatbelt denylist bypass and a VS Code task configuration. Pillar says the trigger is prompt injection planted in a README, an issue, a dependency or a diff, and that “an agent's blast radius is not the agent process; it includes everything the agent can write that the host later trusts.”